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State Challenges to
Related Party Transactions

D. French Slaughter
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Washington, D.C.
October 10, 2000

State Tax Planning Using Related Party Transactions Under
the Microscope

I. Related Party Transactions - Respected By the Courts
A. Alabama Dept. of Rev. v. Sonat, Inc., (CV-94-3867, Aug. 27, 1999), 1999 Ala.
Lexis 227.
1. Facts. Sonat was a holding company that owned Sonat Offshore Drilling
("SODI"). SODI paid substantial dividends to Sonat, which is taxable in
Alabama.
Alabama law permits a deduction for dividends received from certain affiliated
corporations that are taxable by Alabama. For Sonat to take advantage of this
deduction, it was necessary for SODI to be taxable by Alabama. Apparently for
this reason, SODI leased a single workstation to a wholly owned subsidiary of
Sonat for use by that subsidiary in its Birmingham office. The monthly rent was
$145.
In 1988, SODI paid a dividend of $185 million to Sonat, which Sonat deducted on
the grounds that SODI was subject to Alabama tax on the income it received from
leasing the workstation.
2. State Attack. The Alabama Department of Revenue rejected Sonat's deduction
of the dividend on the grounds that the lease between SODI and a related
corporation was entered into in order that Sonat could avoid paying taxes on the
dividends received from SODI. If the lease were not respected, SODI would have
no Alabama taxable income and the dividend to Sonat would be taxable in full.
The Department characterized the lease as a sham, having no practical economic
effect other than to create an income tax benefit.
3. Holding. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the Department's position. The
court agreed with the Department "that it seems likely that the primary, if not the
sole, purpose of the [lease] was to qualify Sonat for the dividends received
deduction. Even if this were the sole purpose of the lease, that does not make it a
'sham' nor does it mean that the transaction should be disregarded. The court
finds whatever the motivation, the lease was 'real,' the workstation was located in
Alabama, and the rent was paid."

B. The Maryland Cases.

1. Taxpayer Wins. On March 17, 2000, the Maryland Circuit Court for Baltimore
City affirmed the decisions of the Maryland Tax Court in SYL, Inc. v.
Comptroller, MCI International Telecommunications Corp v. Comptroller, and
Crown Cork & Seal (Delaware) Inc. v. Comptroller that attributional nexus is
limited to "phantom" entities under Maryland law. The court concluded that the
companies at issue were not "phantom" or "sham" corporations since they had
economic substance and were established for valid business purposes, including
the protection of valuable intellectual property rights.
2. MCI International Telecommunications Corp. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury (Md. Cir. Ct., No. 24-C-99-002387).
(a). Facts. MCI International Telecommunications ("Taxpayer") is a wholesaler
of international telecommunications services. It is part of an affiliated group of
corporations. The parent of the affiliated group is MCI Communications, which
has two subsidiaries: MCI Telecommunications, which operates throughout the
U.S., including Maryland, and MCI International, which provides international
telecommunications. MCI International is the parent of Taxpayer.
Taxpayer provides international voice service to its customers. Its existence was
mandated by the need to a single entity operating in an environment heavily
regulated by the federal government. In addition, the Taxpayer, was a completely
different type of business than the domestic voice transmission business.
Taxpayer provides international telephone service to foreign telephone companies
and domestic long-distance telephone companies in exchange for service fees. An
international telephone call completed by Taxpayer starts at a mainland point. If
it is an inbound call to the United States, the call typically originates with the
customer of a foreign telephone company. The foreign company bills its
customers and pays Taxpayer a service fee. At the midpoint on the ocean cable,
Taxpayer picks up the call and transmits it to a cable head where the ocean cable
reaches the shoreline. Taxpayer pays a service fee to its parent, MCI
International, for the capacity to carry calls on the cable. Taxpayer then carries
the call to a gateway switch. Taxpayer terminates the call at the gateway switch.
Taxpayer pays a domestic long distance carrier a service fee for carrying the call.
An outbound call operated in reverse fashion. A domestic long distance carrier
sends the call to its gateway switch, where Taxpayer picks it up and transfers it at
the ocean midpoint to the foreign telephone company, which completes the call
on the foreign side of the transaction. The domestic long distance carrier pays
Taxpayer a fee for its service in completing the international call. Taxpayer
would pay the foreign telephone company a fee for taking its call and completing
it. MCI Telecommunications paid Taxpayer $56 million in service fees.

(b). State Attack. Taxpayer has no nexus with Maryland but MCI
Telecommunications does. The Comptroller treated Taxpayer as having nexus
because of the nexus of its affiliate, MCI Telecommunications. The Comptroller
also used Telecommunication's factors for apportioning the income of Taxpayer,
which did not have any Maryland factors. Essentially the Comptroller determined
that the Taxpayer existed solely to allow MCI Telecommunications to divert
income out of Maryland.
(c). Holding. The circuit court upheld the decision for the Taxpayer by the
Maryland Tax Court. The Tax Court held that Taxpayer did not have nexus with
Maryland and that it was an operating company. Accordingly, the only theory by
which the comptroller could levy a tax was if the Taxpayer was a phantom
corporation within the meaning of Armco Expert, 82 Md.App. 429 (1990) and
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Atlantic Supply Co., 294 Md. 213 (1982). The
Tax Court held that Taxpayer was not a phantom corporation and had economic
substance. Taxpayer performed business activities, generated income from nonaffiliated entities, had substantial property on its books, and had employees.
Further even if Taxpayer had nexus with Maryland, the comptroller would be
required to use the Taxpayer's apportionment factors and not that of MCI
International.
3. SYL Inc. v. Comptroller (Md. Cir. Ct., No. 24-C-99-002389 and Crown Cork
and Seal Inc. v. Comptroller (Md. Cir. Ct., No. 24-C-99-002388).
(a). Facts. These cases both involved Delaware trademark and protection
companies, which were formed to hold the former trademarks of their parents.
The Delaware subsidiaries then licensed back the trademarks to their parents in
exchange for a royalty. Maryland is a separate entity state so that the payment of
royalties by the parents, which had nexus with Maryland, reduced their Maryland
income tax.
(b). State Attack. The Comptroller treated the subsidiaries has if they were
"phantom" corporations.
(c). Holding. The circuit court upheld the Tax Court's rejection of the
Comptroller's approach. The Tax Court relied on MCI International, concluding
that SYL and Crown had economic substance, were non-phantom corporations,
and did not have substantial nexus with Maryland. The subsidiaries maintained
Delaware bank accounts, received mail in Delaware, and maintained offices in
Delaware. They were established for valid nontax reasons, such as protecting the
transferred intangibles from the claims of their parents' creditors, improving the
management of the intellectual property, and protecting the property from a
hostile takeover. The Tax Courtstated that tax avoidance (ratherthan tax
evasion) was a legitimate business purpose.

4. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Gannett Co., 741 A.2d 1130 (1999).
(a). Facts. Gannett is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Virginia.
Gannett has nexus with Maryland. Gannett maintains centralized company
accounts for its subsidiaries. The subsidiaries deposit proceeds in these accounts
and draw them out to pay expenses. If a subsidiary deposits more than it
withdraws, the excess does not accrue interest. If a subsidiary withdraws more
than it deposits, no interest is charged on the deficit. The parties stipulated that
this arrangement created interest free debt.
Gannett filed a consolidated federal tax return in which the intercompany loans
washed out. Gannett did not report the intercompany loans on its Maryland
return. Maryland does not allow related corporations to file consolidated returns.
(b). State Attack. The Comptroller sought to impute interest income to Gannett
from the interest free loans it made to its subsidiaries. The comptroller relied on
Sections 482 and 7872 of the Internal Revenue Code.
(c). Holding. The Court of Appeals, Maryland's highest court, held that the state
legislature has not authorized the comptroller to exercise power under I.R.C.
Section 482. If the IRS fails to exercise its discretion under Section 482, the
comptroller must accept the resulting federal income.
With respect to Section 7872, the court held that while this provision is mandatory
at the federal level and not discretionary, the Comptroller is required to administer
it pursuant to IRS interpretations. The regulations provide that in the case of a
consolidated return, the failure to impute income has no federal effect.
Accordingly, Gannett as not required to impute interest on its federal return. Its
federal taxable income was correctly determined and the Comptroller must accept
those figures.
C. In the Matter of Petition of Toys R Us-NYTEX, Inc, TAT(H) 93-1039 (GC),
August 4, 1999, 1999 NY City Tax Lexis 31.
1. State Attack. New York attempted to impose a combined report on certain
members of the Toys R Us family. The City argued that substantial intercorporate
transactions were not made on an arm's length basis or must be disregarded. The
statute permits the City to impose a combined report on related corporations if it
is necessary to properly reflect income and tax liability. More specifically, a
combined filing may be required if: there is common ownership among the
corporations to be combined; the corporations are engaged in a unitary business;
and filing on a separate basis would distort a corporation's income.
Regulations issued by the City establish a presumption of distortion where there
are substantial intercorporate transactions between members of a related group.
"Substantial" is defined as that circumstance where as little as 50% of a

corporation's receipts or expenses are from one or more qualified activities. To
overcome this presumption of distortion, the taxpayer must establish that the
transactions were carried on at arm's length.
2. Holding. The Administrative Law Judge rejected the City's position. It found
that the Taxpayer established that the royalty rate that was paid to Geoffrey for
the use of the Toys R Us trademarks occurred at an arm's length rate.
3. Interest Charged At Less Than Arm's Length Not Relevant. Geoffrey lent
some of the royalties it received from affiliated corporations to others in the
corporate family. The judge found that some of the intercorporate loans did not
occur at an arm's length rate of interest. However, in this case the lack of an
arm's length rate of interest actually favored the City. Had an arm's length
interest rate been charged, the amount of income reported by those corporations
doing business in the City would have been even less. Consequently, the lack of
an arm's length interest rate could notjustify the imposition of a combined report.
4. State Attacks Again. In the middle of the formal hearing, the City changed its
theory of the case and argued that combination was appropriate because the
transfer of the trademarks to Geoffrey and the licensing by Geoffrey to affiliated
corporations lacked economic substance.
5. Taxpayer Wins (Again). The ALJ determined that Geoffrey was created for
several valid business purposes, including but not limited to, owning and
protecting the existing Toys R Us trademarks; establishing and registering new
trademarks; licensing those trademarks, and defending the integrity of the
trademarks in litigation. It was anticipated that Geoffrey would realize a profit
from its licensing activities, apart from any tax benefit and that Geoffrey did
realize such a profit. The ALJ concluded that Geoffrey was established for valid
business purposes, was characterized by economic substance, and was not
motivated solely by tax avoidance.
D. JC Penney National Bank v. Johnson No. M1998-00497-SC-Rll-CV, 1999
Tenn. App. Lexis 826 (December 17, 1999) permission to appeal denied (May 8,
2000), cert. denied (October 10, 2000).
1. Facts. JC Penney National Bank (Taxpayer) is a federally chartered national
banking association incorporated and headquartered in Delaware. The Taxpayer
issues Visa and MasterCard credit cards, and offers consumer banking services
such as deposit accounts, home mortgages lending, general consumer loans, and
ATM services.
The Taxpayer is a subsidiary of the JC Penney Company ("Parent"). The Parent
owns and operates retail stores in Tennessee. Taxpayer contracts with Parent for
the provision of various marketing and processing services such as deposit
accounts, home mortgages lending, general consumer loans, and ATM services.

Taxpayer had no office, place of business or employees in Tennessee. Taxpayer
solicited Tennessee residents using the U.S. mail. Other than that, all activities
were provided Taxpayer by its Parent or those persons with whom Parent
subcontracted.
2. State Attack. The Tennessee Department of Revenue assessed franchise and
excise tax against the Taxpayer on income derived from its credit card services.
The Chancery Court (the trial court) upheld the assessment.
3. Holdingfs. The Appeals Court held that Due Process nexus existed. Through its
solicitation of Tennessee customers, the Taxpayer "purposely availed itself of the
substantial privilege of doing business in the State," so that sufficient "minimum
contacts" existed.
However, the Appeals Court held that no Commerce Clause nexus existed. The
Court read Quill as requiring a physical presence nexus standard, notwithstanding
that the assessment at issue was for the State's franchise or excise tax. "While it
is true that the Bellas Hess and Ouill decisions focused on use taxes, we find no
basis for concluding that the analysis should be different in the present case. In
fact, the Commissioner is unable to provide any authority as to why the analysis
should be different for franchise and excise taxes."
4. Physical Presence of Credit Cards Disregarded. The Court rejected the State's
argument that the Taxpayer satisfied the physical presence standard because it
owned the credit cards that cardholders carried with them in Tennessee. The
court agreed with the Commissioner that the cards were tangible property but did
not agree that their presence in Tennessee was constitutionally significant. The
court felt that the cards were virtually worthless and not sufficiently significant to
satisfy the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause. The real value
of the cards were in the intangible rights they represented. "The actual card is not
even necessary to the transaction. It merely serves as a convenient article on
which to record the necessary information regarding the customer's account."
5. Retail Stores. The Court also held that the Parent's stores did not give the
Taxpayer a physical presence in Tennessee. The Parent's stores were not
affiliated with the Taxpayer's credit card operations. The Court noted specifically
that the stores did not accept applications or payments for the credit cards. "The
retail stores conducted no activities which assisted the [Taxpayer] in maintaining
its credit card business in Tennessee. The record shows that one could not apply
for the [Taxpayer's] credit cards at the J.C. Penney retail stores, nor could
individuals make a payment on their... account at the retail stores."
6. Agencv Nexus. Finally, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Taxpayer
had a physical presence through the activities of those persons acting on its
behalf, citing Tyler Pipe and Scripto. The Court described those cases as

situations in which the taxpayers had physical presence through the activities of
their independent contractors in the taxing state. Here, however, none of the
persons providing services on behalf of Taxpayer did so in Tennessee.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the holding of the Chancery Court. On May 8'
2000, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the lower
court decision.
7. Cert Denied. Was the Supreme Court tempted to visit "economic nexus" as a
proper test and limit Ouill to sales and use tax?
E. Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., No. 03-99-00427-CV (Texas, May 11,
2000).
1. Facts. Bandag Licensing Corp. ("BLC") owned three patents that it licensed to
Bandag, its parent, under a 1985 agreement executed outside Texas. Royalty
payments were mailed to BLC's Iowa office; no payments were received in
Texas. BLC did not own, possess, use, or maintain any real or tangible persqoal
property in Texas. It did not have salespeople, employees, independent
contractors, or any other type of representatives in Texas, nor did it send any such
persons into Texas. BLC did not have franchises in Texas, did not distribute
goods or services in Texas under a marketing plan or system prescribed in
substantial part by Bandag, and did not transact any intrastate business in Texas.
However, BLC did possess a Texas certificate of authority throughout the audit
period.
2. State Attack. The Texas Comptroller assessed franchise tax on BLC solely
because BLC held a certificate of authority.
3. Holdine. The court examined the assessment on this basis under the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses. Under the Commerce Clause, the court used the fourpronged test under Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady 430 U.S. 274 (1997), to
derive two questions - is there an "activity" and is there "substantial nexus?"
Because the possession of a certificate of authority is passive, the court held that
there was no activity.
Then the court examined the term "substantial nexus," and found that the physical
presence test declared in Quill and Bellas Hess applied to Texas franchise tax as
well. The court then concluded that when a corporation conducts its activity
solely through interstate commerce and lacks any physical presence in the state,
no sufficient nexus exists to permit the state to assess tax.
4. Due Process Lives! The court also examined whether the imposition of the
Texas franchise tax would offend the Due Process Clause. Because the passive
possession of a certificate of authority would be insufficient for purposes of

personal jurisdiction under state law, the court concluded that it is insufficient for
purposes of imposing the Texas franchise tax.
5. Economic Nexus Denied Too. The court then turned its attention to the issue of
whether the receipts from intangible property created nexus. On appeal to the
court, the Comptroller raised for the first time the contention that the royalty
payments received by BLC were, by themselves, or in conjunction with BLC's
certificate of authority, sufficient to satisfy the substantial nexus test. The court
held that the Comptroller raised this issue too late and had waived its right to
complain of this error. While this type of decision invites another challenge by
the Comptroller, the court indicated that even if the royalty payments were from
the parent's use of patents in Texas, the facts found by the district court did not
support a finding of substantial nexus.

II. Related Party Transactions - Not Respected By the Courts

A. Geoffrey. Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d 13 (S.C. 1993),
cert. denied 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
1. Facts. Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of ToysRUs, Inc., was
incorporated in Delaware with its principal offices located in that state. It had no
employees, offices or physical property located in South Carolina. The Delaware
holding company owned several trademarks and trade names, including
"ToysRUs." Under a license agreement, ToysRUs agreed to pay Geoffrey 1% of
net sales for the right to use the ToysRUs trade name and other trademarks and
trade names in connection with the sale of children's goods in most states. The
trademark was displayed on the six ToysRUs retail stores located in South
Carolina as well as on merchandise and in advertisements.
2. State Attack. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that "licensing intangibles
for use in South Carolina and receiving income in exchange for their use" created
sufficient nexus with state to meet both the "minimum connection" standard
required by the Due Process Clause and the "substantial nexus" requirement of
the Commerce Clause. The court further found that Geoffrey had intangible
properties - a franchise (license of a trademark and a trade name) and accounts
receivable generated by sales - in the state, the presence of which also satisfied
the "minimum connection" due process requirement. Thus the state could
properly impose state corporate income and license tax on this out of state
affiliate of the in-state stores.
3.

Cascading Impact. The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court has
encouraged several stated to increase their efforts to tax out-of-state corporations,
particularly passive investment companies, that do not have a physical presence in
the state. Since the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin this case, the
decision in Geoffrey is law only in the State of South Carolina. However, a

number of states are using Geoffrey-type reasoning to bolster expansion of their
income tax nexus regulations to include economic presence tests.
The following chart reflects the known positions of states that have formally or
informally adopted the "Geoffrey nexus" position by statute, rule or regulation, or
informal audit position:

Statute

State
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Rule

Audit Position
Yes (PICs)

Yes (Priv.Tax)
Yes
Yes (F/S)

Yes (F/S)
Yes

Yes (PICs)
Yes (PICs)
Yes (PICs)
Yes (F/S)

Yes
Yes

Yes (PICs)
Yes (PICs)
Yes (PICs)

Yes (F/S)

Yes (F/S)
Yes
Yes (F/S)

Yes (PIC)
Yes (F/S)
Yes (F/S)
Yes

"F/S" - Financial Services
"PICs" - Passive Investment Companies, Intangible/Intellectual
Property Holding Companies, etc.
B. Matter of Burnham Corporation, DTA No. 814531 (N.Y. Div.Tax.App., ALJ Unit
July 10, 1997)
1. Facts. The taxpayer maintained a Delaware-based trademark holding company.

2. State Attack. The Department focused on the initial transfer of trademarks to the
Delaware holding company and argued that an intercorporate transfer pursuant to
Internal Revenue Code Section 351 (i.e., a nontaxable exchange of property for
stock) always results in a distortive arrangement between the related parties.
3. Holding. The administrative law judge concluded that while an initial transfer
pursuant to I.R.C. Section 351 does not always result in a distortive arrangement,
the splitting of income and the ongoing expenses related to the maintenance of the
income-producing asset did result in distortion of the taxpayer's income in this
instance. The ALJ further determined that there was "little or no economic or
business justification for the formation of" the trademark affiliate and that New
York tax avoidance was the principal purpose behind its formation. Little or no
expenses were incurred by the subsidiary and no real nexus was created by the
subsidiary in Delaware. The ALJ required the two entities to file a New York
combined return.
C. In re Tropicana Product Sales Inc., DTA Nos. 815253 and 815564 (N.Y. Div. Tax
App., ALJ Div.Nov.25,1998), affd.Tax Appeals Tribunal, 815253 and 815564 (June
12, 2000).
1. Facts. Tropicana sales subsidiary forced to file New York combined return with
its out of state parent and feed producing affiliate. Tropicana submitted into
evidence an IRC §482 transfer pricing report prepared in preparation for the
litigation to illustrate that sales of products between the Florida parent and
subsidiaries were at arm's length.
2. State Attack. New York attacked the structure arguing that the omission of the
Florida entities from the New York return distorted the subsidiary's New York
income and that the taxpayer could not rebut the presumption of distortion
because the intercompany pricing was not arm's length.
3. Holding. The ALJ ruled that the transfer pricing analysis "failed to prove that
charges to [the Tropicana subsidiaries] for services, equipment and use of
facilities provided by [the Tropicana parent] were consistent with what would
have been charged by Tropicana if it had been dealing at arm's length with an
uncontrolled party." The transfer pricing study employed the comparable profit
method (CPM) to determine intercompany charges for products and services. In
his ruling, the AU criticized the selection of several companies as comparable
companies in Tropicana's Section 482 analysis on the ground that they lacked
"financial/sales comparability."
4. Refund Sought. The outcome may have been influenced by the fact that the
taxpayer had previously been filing combined with its out-of-state parent in New
York and sought to break combination only when New York sought to combine
the Florida-based feed producing affiliate as well.

D. Overnite Transportation Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, Aug. 13, 1999,
1999 Mass Tax Lexis 48.
1. Facts. Overnite Transportation (Taxpayer) was acquired by Union Pacific for
$1.2 billion. Union Pacific subsequently created a holding company, Overnite
Holding. Union Pacific contributed its Overnite stock to Overnite Holding.
Overnite declared a dividend in the form of a $600 million promissory note to
Overnite Holding, payable in full in ten years. Overnite deducted the interest on
the note.
2. State Attack. The Department of Revenue denied the interest deduction because
it determined that there was no true debt for tax purposes. The note carried an
interest rate that was below market levels and which did not reflect the
foreseeable risk attendant on assumptions that Overnite earnings would grow
indefinitely at projected robust levels. Overnite also continually failed to pay
interest when due. This ongoing default made any expectation of repayment of
the note unrealistic. The note was treated even by the parties as equity and not as
debt.
3. Holding. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Department.
E. In the Matter of Kmart Properties, NM ID. No. 01-287446-00 6, Before the
Hearing Officer of the Taxation and Revenue Department of the State of New
Mexico. (Feb. 1, 2000).
1. Facts. Kmart Properties (Taxpayer) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kmart
Corporation (Parent). Parent's headquarters, principal place of business, and
commercial domicile are in Michigan.
Taxpayer is organized as a Michigan Realty and Investment Company. Taxpayer
has its own offices separate from that of its Parent and had two staff attorneys, a
paralegal, and a legal secretary, some of whom transferred from Parent. Taxpayer
owns all of Parent's domestic service marks, trademarks, and trade names.
Taxpayer granted an exclusive license to Parent for the use of this intellectual
property in return for a 1.1% royalty of the Parent's net sales. The royalties
received by Taxpayer were lent back to Parent, usually within two or three days
from when they were received. None of the loans was ever repaid.
2. Holding. The Hearing Officer of the Taxation and Revenue Department (Hearing
Officer) upheld an assessment for the gross receipts tax and income tax. The
income tax assessment was based on a single factor sales formula. According to
the Hearing Officer, the creation of Taxpayer originated in the Kmart Tax
Department, not its Legal Department. The non-tax reasons for creating the
Taxpayer, i.e., providing greater focus, responsibility and accountability for
management of Kmart's intellectual property, could have been achieved by

forming a separate division within Parent. The Hearing Officer found that the real
reason for the formation of Taxpayer was to reduce Parent's corporate income
taxes in states that allow separate entity filing.
The Hearing Officer concluded that the Taxpayer had due process nexus with
New Mexico. The Taxpayer "has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of an
economic market within New Mexico. [Taxpayer] owns highly valuable
intangible property ...
which it has licensed for use by [Parent] within New
Mexico."
The Hearing Officer next determined that Quill's "substantial nexus" test applied
to income and excise taxes. "I can fird no principled basis to distinguish between
sales and use taxes, and income taxes under the Commerce Clause. The Taxpayer
satisfied this test through its contractual relationship with its Parent under the
license agreement. Under that agreement, Parent uses the trademarks as a
marketing tool to continuously solicit New Mexico residents to purchase
merchandise that creates the income stream that New Mexico seeks to tax. The
Parent's relationship to Taxpayer, "particularly in light of the requirements of
trademark law which render the trademarks inseparable from the goodwill of the
business they are associated with, places [Parent] in the same position as the
salesmen in Scrinto and the independent salesmen in Tyler Pipe. [Parent] is
contractually obligated to do the very things which establish, maintain, and
enhance the market for [Taxpayer's] trademarks in New Mexico in order to
generate a revenue stream for [Taxpayer] derived from those marketing
activities." The Hearing Officer also upheld the Department's use of a single
factor sales formula.
The Hearing Officer distinguished JC Penney. supra, on the grounds that
Penney's retail stores conducted no activities that assisted the Taxpayer in that
case in maintaining its credit card business in Tennessee
The Hearing Officer also concluded that the royalties were subject to the gross
receipts tax.
F. Automatic Data Processing Inc., et al v. Illinois Department of Revenue Dkt. No.
1-99-0324 (Illinois Appellate Court, First District, May 16, 2000).
1. Facts. ADP is a New Jersey-based corporation engaged in providing a wide
range of information and computing services to private business and government
clients. In the 1980's ADP established four wholly owned subsidiaries to manage
certain intangible property. One subsidiary, originally capitalized with cash and
marketable securities, engaged in the business of lending funds to ADP. Another
held the "ADP" trademark, charged a royalty fee to ADP and other subsidiaries
for its use, and invested the proceeds. The remaining two subsidiaries were
capitalized with marketable securities, which they managed and reinvested. The

subsidiaries had few employees and their officers and directors were largely
directors and high-ranking employees of ADP.
2. State Attack. In 1992, the Illinois Department of Revenue audited ADP and its
subsidiaries for the tax years 1987 through 1989. The DOR determined that the
ADP group had understated its Illinois taxes for these years because it had
improperly failed to include these subsidiaries or their income in its calculation of
Illinois taxable income. Following an administrative decision confirming the
resulting assessment, ADP sought administrative in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. After the circuit court affirmed the ALJ's decision, ADP appealed to the
Appellate Court.
On appeal, ADP challenged the DOR's assessment on the grounds that (1) the
subsidiaries' income would not have been nonbusiness income allocable outside
Illinois if it had been earned directly by ADP and therefore should not be treated
as unitary business income; (2) apportioning the income by means of the ordinary
three-factor formula grossly and unfairly distorted ADP's Illinois taxable income,
so that ADP was entitled to discretionary apportionment; and (3) the subsidiaries
were "investment companies" and therefore qualified as "financial organizations"
that were properly excluded from ADP's unitary business group.
3. Holding. Addressing ADP's positions in turn, the Appellate Court first rejected
the argument that the subsidiaries' income was not business income. According
to the court, the burden was on ADP to show that the income was not business
income, and given the facts, the ALJ and the DOR were correct in determining
that the income in question satisfied both the functional and transactional tests. In
so holding, the court focused on the fact that, both before and after creation of the
subsidiaries in question, ADP regularly invested in marketable securities.
However, the question is properly whether that activity was unitary with ADP's
regular business conducted in Illinois. Thus, the court's analysis was not
particularly convincing.
4. Three Factor Apportionment Not Distortive. The court next turned to ADP's
argument that using the three-factor formula to apportion the income of the
subsidiaries constituted a gross distortion that would justify its use of an
alternative apportionment formula. According to the court, even if it were to
accept the distortion testimony of ADP's expert, the income apportioned to
Illinois under the regular formula was only 8 percent higher that under the
alternative American Home Products formula proposed by ADP, falling short of a
situation requiring relief under the Due Process and Commerce clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. The court also relied on the administrative law judge's finding that
the income generated by ADP's subsidiaries was subsequently used by ADP in its
business and that ADP engaged in substantial income-producing activities in
Illinois. Accordingly, the court concluded that it was fair for the DOR to utilize
the three-factor formula to apportion some of that income to Illinois.

5. Taxpayer Tries to Defend Subs as "Financial Institutions." Finally, the court
addressed the principal issue of interest to other taxpayers - whether the
subsidiaries qualified as "financial organizations" required by Illinois law to be
excluded from ADP's unitary business group. ADP claimed that its subsidiaries
qualified under the "investment company" category of financial organization.
The DOR claimed that the term "investment company" was limited to companies
subject to regulation under the federal Investment Company Act of 1940, a
definition that admittedly would not include the subsidiaries in issue. Finding the
issue to be a "mixed question of law and fact," the court held that it must review
the DOR's determination of the subsidiaries' classification under a clearly
"erroneous" standard review that accords substantial weight and deference to the
DOR's interpretation of the Illinois statute.
In the absence of a statutory definition of "investment company," the court agreed
with the parties that the term should be accorded its ordinarily understood
meaning. The court examined ADP's contention that such meaning is found in
standard references such as Black's Law Dictionary, which defines the terms to
include "an issuer which.. is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily.. in
the business of investing" apparently without regard to the fact or degree of
governmental regulation. On the other hand, pointing to the fact that the above
definition appears to be taken from, and actually cites, the federal Investment
Company Act, as well as to a second definition of the term as equivalent to a
regulated mutual fund, the court also agreed with the DOR that Black's definition
arguably limited the term "investment company" to government-regulated
entities.
Acknowledging that reasonable arguments favored both interpretations, the court
held: "In the presence of this ambiguity, we defer to the Department's reading."
In support of its holding, the court found, that under ADP's broad interpretation
of the terms, every company that invested in another company would qualify as
an "investment company" and "three-factor apportionment would be an exception
rather that the rule," which "[w]e do not think... would comport with legislative
intent." The court also found the DOR's narrow definition "more compatible
with the spirit behind combined reporting," because "functionally integrated
companies are best combined in one group when feasible."
It should be noted that the court in ADP failed to address the rationale recently
advanced by the circuit court in Dover Corp. v. Illinois Departmentof Revenue
(Circuit Court of Cook County, Jan. 14, 2000). In Dover, the court ruled that
subsidiaries established for the sole purpose of managing a corporate group's
excess capital and intercompany debt obligations qualified as "investment
companies," as well as "private bankers" and "industrial bankers," all "financial
organizations" under Illinois law. In addition to finding that these labels
accurately described the subsidiaries' income - interest, dividends, and capital
gains - was exactly the type of income that the "financial organization" formula
was specifically designed to apportion. If ADP's appeal is rejected by the Illinois

Supreme Court - a likely result - Dover's pro-taxpayer decision will almost
certainly be overturned, as that appeal is to the same appellate court that decided
ADP.
ADP will petition the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal the Appellate
Court's decision.
G. The Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, ATB Docket No.
F233560 (July 19, 2000).
1. Facts. Parent operating companies transferred tax-free to and licensed back from
two Delaware subsidiaries its trademark intellectual property. It claimed over
$1 0OM in deductions for royalties to its wholly-owned subsidiaries, each of which
was a Delaware intangibles holding company.
2. State Attack. The Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board (ATB") found that
transactions consisting of the transfer of certain trademarks and tradenames to the
subsidiaries and the subsequent license of those intangibles back to SherwinWilliams lacked business purpose and economic substance. Accordingly, based
on the sham transaction doctrine, the ATB ruled that the adjustments made by the
Commissioner were proper. The ATB rejected each of the business purposes
asserted by Sherwin-Williams in support of the transactions. In its view, each of
the non-tax business purposes alleged by the corporation either could not be
achieved, had already been achieved prior to the transactions, or would actually
expose the corporation to serious economic risk. Moreover, enhancement of
licensing opportunities was not a valid business purpose because the corporation
would have no interest in increasing the royalty rates to which it, as a licensee,
would have no entitlement.
The transactions lacked economic substance because no risk of loss to the
corporation was created by the transfers to its wholly owned subsidiaries and it
retained all the benefits and control with respect to the trademarks. Furthermore,
no practical economic effect resulted from the transfer and license-back
transactions given the possible circular flow of funds among the entities.
In addition, the ATB ruled that the deductions were properly disallowed based
upon the substance over form doctrine. The ATB concluded that despite the form
of the transactions, "[t]he original owner of the Marks was still in exclusive
control of them and retained all the benefits from them; nothing of substance
changed as a result of the transactions."
The ATB also found that the payment of royalties by Sherwin-Williams to its
wholly-owned subsidiaries was not deductible as an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense. To be deductible, the ATB concluded that there must be some
valid business purpose justifying the payment of royalties for the use of the
intangibles, other than a mere paper agreement between the parent and its
subsidiaries. Based on the record, the ATB found that the transfer and licensing
transactions between the entities should have been royalty-free. The ATB

determined that it was Sherwin-Williams that maintained the value of the
intangibles and that the subsidiaries "had not developed the Marks in any way, or
built any goodwill, or created anything of value that could be licensed back to the
parent." The court found that the corporation and the subsidiaries had
interlocking directors and officers, the corporation paid the majority of expenses
and retained ultimate control of the trademarks, it remained responsible for all
advertising and substantially all quality control relative to the trademarks, and the
subsidiaries relied on the corporation to solicit third-party license agreements.
Finally, the ATB ruled that the Commissioner had properly exercised his authority
to make an arm's length adjustment under M.G.L. c. 63, §39A. Moreover, the
ATB did not find the taxpayer favorable cases cited by Sherwin-Williams, e.g.,
New York City's In re Toys "R" Us-NYTEX, Inc. and Maryland's SYL, Inc., to be
persuasive, because the Commissioner did not disregard the subsidiaries as valid
corporations and did not attempt to combine all the income of the subsidiaries into
the parent.
H. Syms Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. App. Tax Bd, Sept. 14, 2000.
1. Facts. Delaware holding company (Syl, Inc.) formed as subsidiary of Syms to
hold trademarks of Syms, nationwide apparel retailer. Syms transferred to Syl
and Syl licensed back to Syl marks for net sales royalty of 4%. Syms jumped the
gun and deducted some royalties to Syl before its creation and transfer of the
marks. Annual royalty also always followed by tax free dividend payment by Syl
back to Syms. Over multi-year period Syms paid $10 million in royalties to Syl
based on nationwide sales. Syl has only a part-time "shared" employee and
"shared" office in Delaware. No third party licensing or contemporaneous 482
study was done.
2. State Attack. Mass.Commissioner denied Syms the royalty deduction to Syl on
grounds that the deduction was a distortion of Syms' Mass. income.
3. Holding. Following closely, if not precisely, the reasoning it adopted in SherwinWilliams, the Court held the "canned" business purpose and "pure paper shuffle"
of the Syms-Syl relationship did not support the claimed deductions.
III. The Legal Theories - For What It's Worth
A.

Sham/Lack of Economic Substance

B.

Section 482 Reallocation/Lack of Arm's Length Pricing and Terms

C.

Distortion of Income

D.

Economic Nexus

E.

Agency Nexus

F.

Lack of Business Purpose

G.

Anti-PIC Legislation or Regulation (e.g., Connecticut, Ohio)

H.

Step Transaction

IV. Remedies Used By The Courts

V.

A.

Forced Combination or Consolidation

B.

Disallowance of Outbound Deduction

C.

Separate Filing Based On Finding of Nexus

D.

Factor Manipulation

Critical Factors
A.

Avoid Selecting Poor Candidates Where Preexisting Facts Are Not Good
1. Business Purpose and Existing Practices

B.

Implementing Poorly
1. After-the-Fact Section 482 Transfer Pricing Studies
2. Lack of Substance

C.

Operational Neglect
1. Not Paying Interest on Royalty When Due, e.g. Ovemite

D.

Assess a Court's Predisposition in Tax Cases
1. Facts, Facts, Facts

VI. "Current Best Practices"
A.

Aligning Tax Objectives With Other Business Imperatives
1. Business Purpose is Obvious and Organic
2. Implementation is Easy
3. Operation is Easier

B.

Embedded Royalty Structures
1. Using the Natural Protection of P.L. 86-272
2. Typical Contexts
a. Contract Manufacturing
b. Customer Relationship Management

